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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO REVIEW THE 
ENTIRE RECORD MADE IN THIS CASE, THUS VIOLATING 
SECTION 35-1-82.54, U.C.A. 
Section 35-1-82.54, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
provides in pertinent part: 
The Commission... shall review the entire 
record made in said case... 
(emphasis added) 
The Reporter's Certificate shows that the transcript was not 
prepared until March 8, 1976 (R.135), that is, after the review 
by the Industrial Commission on January 27, 1976, and after the 
filing of the appeal to this Court on February 26, 1976. Respon-
dent simply did not comply with the statute and denied appellant's 
Petition for Review without the hearing evidence before it. Yet 
respondent purports to base the Denial of Claimant's Petition for 
Review on insufficient evidence, stating (R.217): 
The Commission does not believe there is 
sufficient evidence to sustain the allegation 
of the employers willful negligence in this 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
case, and therefore, the additional 15% 
compensation should be denied, (emphasis 
added) 
Respondent acted arbitrarily and in excess of its powers when 
it made its decision without reviewing the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
NO FAILURE OF APPELLANT'S CAUSED HIM NOT TO GAIN 
ACCESS TO THE RECORD. 
Respondent argues that, if appellant did not have access 
to the record and transcript of the hearing, it was through 
his own failure. Respondent's Brief, 10-11. Respondent admits, 
however, that appellant made a request to have 20 days to review 
the record when it was available« Respondent's Brief, 10. 
Appellant was not advised when the record was prepared, even 
though the Commission has no published regulations requiring 
appellant to take further steps to obtain a transcript, such as 
appellant directly requesting the reporter to prepare a transcript 
or appellant otherwise "ordering" it. Appellant made a formal 
request to respondent for a reasonable opportunity to review 
the record when prepared; that request was ignored. The reason is 
clearly that no transcript was prepared for the review (see Point I). 
The issue is whether or not that denies appellant a fair opportun-
ity to present his case, pursuant to the administrative review 
provisions of Chapter 1 of Title 35, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended, and the due process clauses of the Utah Constitution 
and of the United States. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT III 
THE STANDARD OF "WILLFULNESS" ARGUED FOR BY RES-
PONDENT SHOULD NOT BE ADOPTED. 
Respondents Brief (at 4-5) argues that the Utah Supreme 
Court long ago adopted a standard of "willfulness" in Western 
Clay and Metals Co- v. Industrial Commissiony 70 U. 279, 259 
P. 927 (1927), by citing with approval the standards of several 
other jurisdictions. This standard would require proof of 
"premeditation, obstinacy, and intentional wrong doing" by the 
employer for the injured employee to win increased compensation. 
The standard is impossible, practically speaking, and, what is 
more important, it is faulty. 
The cases cited with approval by this Court in Western Clay 
and Metals Co. v. . Industrial Commission, supra, were not dis-
cussing "willfulness" in the context of a provision for increased 
compensation based on the "willfulness" of an employer in fail-
ing to do certain things. Rather, those cases all applied 
"willful" to the injured worker's failure to utilize safety 
appliances, under a section where such a "willful" failure by 
the injured worker would have barred him from receiving any 
compensation whatsoever: Wick v. Gunn, 169 P. 1087 at 1087-8 
(Okla. 1917). 
Applying this standard of "willfulness" to the employer, 
as well as the injured worker, is improper because of the pre-
sumption in favor of those workers for whose protection the act 
was passed. Wick v. Gunn, supra, at 1090, and Long v. Western 
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States Refining C o w 14 U. 2d 398, 384 P. 2d 1015 (1963). 
The standard of "willfulness" is accordingly made quite high-
purposely and explicitly - in relation to the injured worker. 
But in relation to the employer it should be correspondingly 
lower. This Court should not perpetuate a standard that was 
taken from one section of the act and applied to a different 
section without discussion or acknowledgment of the issues 
raised here. 
Simply put, appellant argues that the standard of "willful-
ness" is different here and that an employer's failure to have 
any safety program in effect should be a sufficiently willful 
failure to entitle the injured worker to 15% increased compen-
sation as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
..-.-.•- POINT IV-
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENTS OF FACTS DO NOT ALL REFLECT ' 
THE RECORD ACCURATELY. 
Respondent's Brief (at 5) states, "The company conducted 
periodic safety meetings (R.71)." The record indicates that 
Mr. Steve Lee, Division Manager at defendant, Eaton Metals, 
testified as follows(at R.71): 
Q. Did you ever instruct your production superin-
tendent or anyone else, to talk to these work-
men about the work habits that would be necessary 
in working around that boom while it was up on 
that pipe? 
A. We have periodical safety meetings. 
Q. That wasn't my question. Did you ever instruct 
them? 
A. I did not. 
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Q. Do you know, of your own knowledge, whether 
any safety meeting was held about the time 
of the accident in connection with that boom? 
A. I do not. 
(Emphasis added) 
Note that Mr, Lee metioned periodic safety meetings in an 
unresponsive answer and put his statement in the present tense. 
All he actually testified to was that periodic safety meetings 
were being held at the time of the hearing over a year after 
the accident. Then in response to the third question quoted, 
he admitted he did not know of any safety meeting held in 
connection with the boom about the time of the accident. 
Respondent's Brief (at 6) states, "When Mr. Lemon went to 
work on the Monday morning of the accident he stated he felt the 
area was unsafe, but he took no action to notify or warn anyone. 
(R. 107,120)." The record indicates that Mr. Lemon testified 
as follows (at R.107): 
Q. Now on the day that Willie was injured. And you 
came out and saw this boom on this pipe, did you 
talk to Dutch or anybody else out there as to that 
being an unsafe area for people to work in? 
A. Not that day. 
Q. Did you prior to that time? 
A. We had asked him to weld it up. 
Respondent's Brief (at 6) states that Plaintiff's witness, 
Steven Carlson, "never made any comments to his supervisor, Dutch, 
about any hazard he may have sensed, (R.133)." This is true as 
far as it goes, but Mr. Carlson also testified that he had 
commented about the possible hazard to Mr. Lemon who he understood 
to have some supervisory authority over him. (R.132-134). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above as well as in appellant's 
Brief, appellant asks this Court to grant relief as requested. 
DATED this 11th day of March, 1977. 
Respectfully submitted, 
i^K^s V 
MICHAEL SHEPARD (/ 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered 2 copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief to James R. Black, Ten West 
Broadway, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 11th day of 
March 1977. 
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